# Fleet — what China already runs

The operating fleet GEM tracks as built (funnel stage `5_operating`). This is a
project-level, **lower-bound** subset of China's real grid — GEM undercounts in
places (e.g. hydro rows are thin against NEA's reported fleet), so treat it as a floor,
not the official total.

**Snapshot 2026-10-14:** 23,080 units · **2,467.5 GW**
(GEM Global Integrated Power Tracker, ArcGIS layer updated 2026-02-18; pulled 2026-10-14)

## By fuel

| Fuel | GW | Units | Share of tracked GW |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Coal | 1,022.2 | 2,545 | 41.4% |
| Solar | 485.2 | 12,874 | 19.7% |
| Wind | 443.7 | 5,410 | 18.0% |
| Hydro | 213.4 | 661 | 8.6% |
| Gas/Thermal | 128.9 | 438 | 5.2% |
| Storage (pumped hydro) | 58.7 | 52 | 2.4% |
| Nuclear | 58.1 | 58 | 2.4% |
| Other | 57.3 | 1,042 | 2.3% |

Storage is pumped-storage hydro only. GEM files reservoir dams as hydro "conventional
storage"; ChinaQueue counts those as Hydro. GEM's China export has no battery projects:
NEA's new-type (mostly battery) storage figures are in [storage.md](https://chinaqueue.com/storage.md).

## Modernization flip

Compare the coal fleet China operates with the coal it is building:

- **Operating:** 65.7% of operating coal capacity is **supercritical** (671.3 GW); 34.1% is
  ultra-supercritical (348.6 GW).
- **Active pipeline** (construction + pre-construction + announced): 92.4% is
  **ultra-supercritical** (338.6 GW).

The coal being added is the highest-efficiency class, so the buildout modernizes the
thermal fleet even as it adds to it.

## Data

- [summary.json](https://chinaqueue.com/data/summary.json) — `fleet` (by fuel, coal modernization)